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THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION AND 
ONLINE CONSUMER CONTRACTS 
Hilary Smith 
Consumer contracts have long posed a challenge for 
traditional contract enforcement regimes. With the rise in 
quick online transactions involving clickwrap and 
browsewrap contracts, these challenges only become more 
pressing. This Note identifies the problems inherent in the 
current system and explores proposals and past attempts to 
improve online consumer contract interpretation and 
enforcement. Ultimately, this Note identifies the Federal 
Trade Commission (“FTC”) as an appropriate and effective 
agency to provide the much-needed change to online consumer 
contract enforcement. Based upon its authority under Section 
5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act to regulate unfair 
business practices, the broad discretion that Congress has 
afforded the FTC, and its successful incursion into the related 
field of online privacy law, the FTC is uniquely situated to 
promulgate a new online consumer contracting regime. This 
Note illustrates the basis and precedent for such a step and 
explores the form and effects of FTC involvement in online 
consumer contracts. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The pervasiveness of online clickwrap and browsewrap1 
contracting to the consumer experience raises questions 
about the process of contract formation and, more pressingly, 
 
1 Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form 
Contracting in the Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 464 (2002) (“In 
browsewrap contracts, Internet users, if they bother to look, will find a 
‘terms or conditions’ hyperlink somewhere on web pages that offer to sell 
goods and services. These contracts generally provide that using the site to 
purchase the goods or services offered (or just visiting the site) constitutes 
acceptance of the conditions contained therein. Clickwrap contracts 
require consumers to click through one or more steps that constitute the 
formation of an agreement.”). 
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the appropriate method of interpretation and enforcement. 
This new, online contract medium has invited legal 
theoreticians and policy makers to attempt to promulgate 
targeted enforcement regimes that treat online consumer 
contracts as a distinct class.2 While the necessity of a 
specialized body of law for online consumer contracts is 
questionable,3 the rise of online consumer contracts 
exacerbates the problems of traditional consumer contracts, 
heightening the need for an interpretation and enforcement 
mechanism that balances the interests of consumer 
protection, contract autonomy, and efficiency. This Note 
identifies the problems inherent in treating consumer 
contracts as bargained-for contracts between commercially 
sophisticated parties and explores present approaches to 
interpreting online consumer contracts as well as theoretical 
solutions and failed proposals. Ultimately, this Note 
identifies enforcement by the Federal Trade Commission 
(“FTC”) as a promising solution to the consumer contract 
problem, based upon the FTC’s present exercise of authority 
in analogous situations and its unique regulatory and 
adjudicatory powers. 
II. BACKGROUND ON END USER LICENSE 
AGREEMENTS AND CONSUMER CONTRACTS 
A. Impact of Online Contracting on Consumer 
Contracts 
Consumer and commercial contracts are apples and 
oranges. Consumer contracts, in fact, are not even properly 
categorized as contracts. The Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts requires a contract be the product of “a bargain in 
which there is a manifestation of mutual assent to the 
exchange and a consideration.”4 As the vast majority of 
 
2 See infra Part II.A. 
3 See infra Part II.A. 
4 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
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consumer contracts are contracts of adhesion, there is no 
meaningful bargaining process. Furthermore, the no-reading 
problem in consumer contracts undermines the notion that 
consumers even give proper consent. As Ronald J. Gilson, 
Charles F. Sabel, and Robert Scott unapologetically state, 
“legally unsophisticated parties by definition do not design 
contracts.”5 
The fundamental differences between consumer and 
commercial contracts result in serious problems when 
contract law attempts to treat them as the same.6 Current 
contract rules presume that contracts have been negotiated7 
and give deference to contractual terms based upon a theory 
of autonomy.8 While the autonomy theory of contracts may 
well be the appropriate approach for contracts between 
sophisticated parties, where each has bargained for its own 
interests, it does not rationally extend to consumer contracts 
where the consumer has no meaningful capacity to influence 
terms and is frequently unaware of what the terms are.9 
Since the rise of online transactions, much attention has 
been given to the proper method for interpreting and 
enforcing online end user license agreements (“EULAs”). 
Jurisprudence surrounding e-contracting initially focused on 
the sufficiency of a click as a surrogate for a signature. This 
question was quickly resolved in the affirmative when 
Congress passed the ESIGN Act in 2000.10 By determining 
that clicking assent served the same function as a signature, 
courts and Congress brought online contracts within the 
 
5 Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel & Robert E. Scott, Text and 
Context: Contract Interpretation as Contract Design, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 
23, 75 (2014). 
6 Id. at 76. 
7 Russell A. Hakes, Focusing on the Realities of the Contracting 
Process—An Essential Step to Achieve Justice in Contract Enforcement, 12 
DEL. L. REV. 95, 112 (2011). 
8 Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of 
Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 556 (2003). 
9 See Gilson, Sabel & Scott, supra note 5, at 27. 
10 Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act § 101, 
15 U.S.C. § 7001 (2012). 
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larger body of consumer contracts. Some have argued for 
different rules to govern online contracts, and the American 
Law Institute (“ALI”) went so far as to publish Principles of 
the Law of Software Contracts, suggesting a distinct 
interpretation regime. However, online contracts are 
fundamentally no different from traditional print contracts11 
and attempting to treat them differently is both unnecessary 
and unlikely to be successful. 
The primary impact of the rise of online contracts upon 
consumer contracts is an exacerbation of the already existing 
issues of consumer contracts. Online contracting has done 
this in three primary ways. First, online contracts increase 
the problem of non-readership.12 Second, online transactions 
have increased the ease and decreased the costs to sellers of 
including lengthy contracts. All consumer transactions 
involve lengthy contracts; however, prior to online 
contracting, these terms were frequently provided by default 
rules.13 The ease with which sellers can supply their own 
terms does not mean that contracts are now more complex, 
but it does mean that terms are increasingly supplied by a 
party with interests contrary to those of the consumer.14 This 
results in terms that are both more pro-seller and less 
consistent between transactions.15 Shultz and Wilde propose 
 
11 Ronald J. Mann & Travis Siebeneicher, Just One Click: The Reality 
of Internet Retail Contracting, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 984, 989 (2008) 
(explaining that “[t]he customer’s decision to place an item in a shopping 
cart and ‘click here to buy’ provides the electronic parallel to the retail 
purchasing decision”). 
12 Robert A. Hillman & Maureen O’Rourke, Defending Disclosure in 
Software Licensing, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 95, 103 (2011). 
13 Omri Ben-Shahar, Regulation Through Boilerplate: An Apologia, 
112 MICH. L. REV. 883, 883–84 (2014) (reviewing MARGARET JANE RADIN, 
BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW 
(2013)). 
14 Id. 
15 Bakos, Marotta-Wurgler, and Trossen empirically find that term 
bias does not correlate with price. While this does not indicate exploitation 
of buyers by sellers, it does suggest that online consumer purchases are 
inaccurately priced, as price ought to reflect the quality of contract terms. 
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a compelling model in which sellers are motivated by 
competitive forces to provide a satisfactory product complete 
with satisfactory contract terms.16 Under this theory, seller-
dictated terms would not harm consumers. However, Schultz 
and Wilde also identify an exception to the incentive to 
provide satisfactory terms when an insufficient number of 
consumers are adequately informed of contract terms.17 
Online consumer contracts fall within this exception, as 
discussed below. Third, online transactions lack the same 
degree of formalism that is present in their print 
counterparts. While it is well established that a click legally 
does function as a signature, social psychology suggests that 
people give greater weight to contracts created with more 
formalism.18 If consumers consider online contracts less 
binding, then they are even less likely to weigh the terms or 
to invest in reading them. 
B. Problems with Online Consumer Contracts 
Perhaps the greatest problem with enforcing consumer 
contracts as commercial contracts is that consumers are not 
even aware of the terms to which they agree. To overcome 
the gaping hole in the assent requirement of valid contracts, 
courts have relied upon the long-standing duty to read. In 
1875, the United States Supreme Court declared, 
It will not do for a man to enter into a contract, and, 
when called upon to respond to its obligations, to say 
that he did not read it when he signed it, or did not 
know what it contained. . . . A contractor must stand 
by the words of his contract; and, if he will not read 
 
See Yannis Bakos, Florencia Marotta-Wurgler & David R. Trossen, Does 
Anyone Read the Fine Print? Consumer Attention to Standard-Form 
Contracts, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 29 (2014). 
16 See generally Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in 
Markets on the Basis of Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic 
Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 630 (1979). 
17 Id. at 660. 
18 Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & David A. Hoffman, The Common Sense of 
Contract Formation, 67 STAN. L. REV. 1269, 1297 (2015). 
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what he signs, he alone is responsible for his 
omission.19 
While true for bargained-for commercial contracts, this 
moral imperative leads to irrational and inefficient results 
when applied to EULAs. The duty to read doctrine creates a 
presumption “that the signer read, understood, and 
assented” to the terms of the contract.20 Empirical evidence 
shows that this assumption is wholly inaccurate. In a 
comprehensive survey of consumer contracting practices, 
Yannis Bakos, Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, and David R. 
Trossen found between 0.05% and 0.22% of shoppers access 
EULAs.21 Of those who do access the EULAs, most do not 
spend enough time on the page to read the terms.22 
Not willing to abandon the duty to read doctrine, some 
online consumer contract reformers and courts have 
attempted to brush aside the obvious problem of non-
readership by emphasizing opportunity to read.23 Their 
approach keeps with autonomy theory and asserts that a 
valid contract is formed if consumers are given a sufficient 
opportunity to read the contract terms. The ALI adopted this 
approach.24 However, this emphasis on increasing the 
accessibility of terms is misplaced. As Bakos, Marotta-
Wurgler, and Trossen so aptly point out, the cost of becoming 
informed regarding the terms of a contract is comprised 
primarily of the burden of reading and understanding the 
terms, not of accessing those terms.25 Marotta-Wurgler 
substantiates this claim empirically, finding that readily 
accessible terms presented in the manner advocated by the 
 
19 Upton v. Tribilcock, 91 U.S. 45, 50 (1875). 
20 Fivey v. Pa. R.R. Co., 52 A. 472, 473 (N.J. 1902). 
21 Bakos, Marotta-Wurgler & Trossen, supra note 15, at 32. 
22 Id. 
23 See, e.g., Forrest v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 805 A.2d 1007, 1010 
(D.C. 2002); Alabi v. DHL Airways, Inc., 583 A.2d 1358, 1362 (Del. Super. 
Ct. 1990). 
24 PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF SOFTWARE CONTRACTS § 2.02 (AM. LAW 
INST. 2009). 
25 Bakos, Marotta-Wurgler & Trossen, supra note 15, at 1. 
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ALI are only 0.36% more likely to be read than terms 
accessible via a hyperlink.26 An opportunity to read that is 
practically never taken advantage of provides a hollow 
foundation for finding assent. 
As tempting as proposals to increase contract readership 
are from an autonomy standpoint, this solution would be at 
odds with efficiency principles. Not reading EULAs is more 
often than not the rational choice. As Avery Katz theorizes, 
for a consumer, not reading a contract is typically the 
rational choice because of the exceptionally low probability of 
ever triggering any of the clauses contained in the 
agreement.27 Victoria Plaut and Robert Bartlett provide 
another point in favor of not reading, reporting that 
consumers often choose not to read because they believe all 
terms to be the same or irrelevant.28 While this belief does 
not in and of itself prove rationality, the theory of the 
rational consumer—flawed though it may be—endows it 
with at least a degree of self-proof. Florencia Marotta-
Wurgler and Robert Taylor’s data on contract length suggest 
another approach to concluding that failure to read is the 
rational choice. They report that, on average, EULAs have 
become several hundred words longer between 2003 and 
2010.29 This lengthening is a result of a tendency of firms to 
add on new terms instead of replacing old, less functional 
terms. It also reflects an increasing level of complexity in 
consumer contracts.30 This data suggests that, even if it was 
once rational to read, unless the benefits of reading had a 
 
26 Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Will Increased Disclosure Help? 
Evaluating the Recommendation of the ALI’s “Principles of the Law of 
Software Contracts,” 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 165, 165 (2011). 
27 Avery Katz, Your Terms or Mine? The Duty to Read Fine Print in 
Contracts, 21 RAND J. ECON. 518, 520 (1990). 
28 Victoria C. Plaut & Robert P. Bartlett, III, Blind Consent? A Social 
Psychological Investigation of Non-Readership of Click-Through 
Agreements, 36 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 293, 305 (2012). 
29 Florencia Marotta-Wurgler & Robert Taylor, Set in Stone? Change 
and Innovation in Consumer Standard-Form Contracts, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
240, 253 (2013). 
30 Id. 
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significant margin on costs or unless benefits of reading have 
increased, it is no longer rational to do so. The increased 
length and complexity of consumer contracts have increased 
the cost of reading. As the sufficiency of the benefits is 
already in question, this trend provides more evidence in 
favor of the rationality of the failure to read. 
The fact that not reading is likely the rational choice does 
not mean that the current consumer contract regime is 
efficient. In fact, the interaction of consumers with EULAs 
can be characterized as a market failure. It is a basic 
principle of contracts that pro-buyer terms should command 
a higher price and that pro-seller terms should result in a 
discount.31 Based on this theory, some have argued that 
mandatory pro-consumer terms would ultimately be against 
the consumer’s interests because of ensuing increases in 
price. This argument depends on the assumption that price 
will accurately reflect the contract terms. In an empirical 
survey, however, Bakos, Marotta-Wurgler, and Trossen 
found no correlation between EULA term bias and price.32 Of 
course there are issues of interpretation, including the 
possibility that contract terms have too small of an impact on 
price to be distinguished from other noise; however, this 
evidence does at least point towards a market failure. 
Furthermore, in the case that contract terms have too small 
of an impact on price for the effect to be observable, there 
should be no statistically significant increase in price were 
mandatory pro-consumer terms to be imposed. 
In contrast to Bakos, Marotta-Wurgler, and Trossen’s 
findings, James Anderson and Frank Gollop’s study of the 
impact of warranty on price did yield a correlation.33 Yet, for 
 
31 Clayton P. Gillette, Rolling Contracts as an Agency Problem, WIS. 
L. REV. 679, 699 (2004) (arguing that contract terms are a part of the 
purchased good or service). 
32 Bakos, Marotta-Wurgler & Trossen, supra note 15, at 29. 
33 See generally James E. Anderson & Frank M. Gollop, The Effect of 
Warranty Provisions on Used Car Prices, in EMPIRICAL APPROACHES TO 
CONSUMER PROTECTION ECONOMICS 67, 67–102 (Pauline M. Ippolito & 
David T. Scheffman eds., 1986). 
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several reasons, this finding does not invalidate the 
conclusions of Bakos, Marotta-Wurgler, and Trossen. It is 
possible, and even likely, that comprehensive warranties 
provide consumers with such a significant benefit and 
impose such a great cost upon sellers that they may be 
accurately priced even while other terms are not. Alternately 
or additionally, Anderson and Gollop only studied warranties 
on used cars—a sample group that is not representative of 
consumer contracts as a whole, as it seems likely they would 
frequently involve expensive invocation of warranty rights—
and that involved print and not online contracting. 
If one accepts that the price does not accurately reflect 
the contract terms in consumer contracts, the next natural 
question is what allows this exploitation and market failure? 
Ian Ayres and Alan Schwartz provide an explanation in their 
empirical finding that consumers are, on the whole, 
overoptimistic about their contract terms.34 This 
overoptimism results in consumer willingness to overpay.35 
Robert Hillman and Jeffrey Rachlinski corroborate this 
through their reciprocal finding that consumers consistently 
underestimate bad outcomes.36 Defenders of the efficiency of 
EULA terms argue that pro-seller contract terms would 
rarely be the optimal technique for exploiting market 
power.37 However, if consumers are undervaluing favorable 
terms and overestimating the favorability of terms, then 
sellers are imposing terms that reduce their costs rather 
than choosing to increase price; they are taking advantage of 
a narrow but pervasive market failure. 
The next question to be answered is why does this 
consumer error go uncorrected? Marotta-Wurgler offers the 
 
34 Ian Ayres & Alan Schwartz, The No-Reading Problem in Consumer 
Contract Law, 66 STAN. L. REV. 545, 554 (2014). 
35 Id. at 554, 562–63. 
36 Hillman & Rachlinski, supra note 1, at 452–54. 
37 See Mann & Siebeneicher, supra note 11, at 985–87 (arguing that 
sellers tend to provide consumers with the terms they desire); Marotta-
Wurgler & Taylor, supra note 29, at 261 (arguing that “sellers with 
market power will use their influence over price, not terms”). 
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conclusory explanation that market forces are too weak to 
protect consumers.38 Additionally, it appears that non-
market forces have been insufficient to provide an alternate 
policing mechanism. Some scholars have argued that an 
informed minority does or could provide an adequate policing 
mechanism.39 Under this theory, if a sufficiently large 
minority reads and makes decisions based on contract terms, 
sellers will be incentivized to provide attractive terms in 
order to attract the marginal buyer.40 This is a primary 
element of the principles proposed by the ALI.41 Despite the 
appeal of this theory as a remedy for non-readership, 
scholars have empirically shown that it does not hold.42 The 
percentage of consumers who do read EULAs is dramatically 
less than the percentage predicted to be necessary for an 
informed minority to have any impact.43 
Some scholars have also suggested that a company’s 
concern for its reputation would cause it to employ fair and 
reasonable terms.44 However, there are some sellers who are 
not sufficiently impacted by reputational concerns for this to 
have an adequate constraining effect.45 For example, for 
companies who can exit the market at low cost, the optimal 
strategy may be to maximize profits in the short term, to 
accept any reputation damages, and then to exit.46 
Additionally, sellers who enjoy monopolies or quasi-
 
38 Marotta-Wurgler, supra note 26, at 166 (“When too few buyers are 
sensitive to standard terms . . . there is no ‘informed minority’ of 
comparison shoppers that will induce sellers to internalize buyers’ 
preferences.”). 
39 Plaut & Bartlett, supra note 28, at 294. 
40 See generally Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 16. 
41 See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF SOFTWARE CONTRACTS § 2.02 (AM. 
LAW INST. 2009). 
42 Marotta-Wurgler, supra note 26, at 182. 
43 Bakos, Marotta-Wurgler & Trossen, supra note 15, at 24. 
44 See id. at 7; Gillette, supra note 31, at 707. 
45 See Hillman & O’Rourke, supra note 12, at 101. 
46 RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 112–13 (6th ed. 
2003). 
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monopolies may be relatively immune to reputation 
concerns.47 
A final non-market policing method involves fear of 
litigation.48 Under this mechanism, sellers are incentivized 
to include only fair terms out of fear of costly litigation and 
ensuing reputational damage (this mechanism largely 
involves spillover with reputational policing mechanisms).49 
Given the low number of cases involving EULA terms,50 
there is a limited basis for any fear of litigation and thus 
such fear should have a minimal policing effect. Two primary 
factors likely limit EULA litigation. First, the state of the 
law in favor of enforcing EULA terms is well established.51  
Consumers are unlikely to win suits and therefore less likely 
to bring them in the first place. Second, courts have 
consistently upheld the right of sellers to enforce arbitration 
clauses.52 Given these two minimizing factors, fear of 
litigation is unlikely to play the regulating role it might 
otherwise fill. Non-market factors almost undoubtedly play 
some role in constraining contract terms; however, it is both 
difficult to ascertain the degree of this impact and clear that 
it is not sufficient to entirely remedy the market failure as 
evidenced by the lack of correlation between terms and price. 
 
47 Id. 
48 Bakos, Marotta-Wurgler & Trossen, supra note 15, at 7. 
49 Id. 
50 See Nathan J. Davis, Presumed Assent: The Judicial Acceptance of 
Clickwrap, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577, 589 (2007) (noting that, by 2007, 
there were approximately fifty-eight cases regarding enforceability of 
clickwrap contract terms). 
51 See Juliet M. Moringiello & William L. Reynolds, What’s Software 
Got to Do with It? The ALI Principles of the Law of Software Contracts, 84 
TUL. L. REV. 1541, 1543, 1552–53 (2010). 
52 See, e.g., 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012) (providing for the validity, 
irrevocability, and enforcement of agreements to arbitrate); Volt Info. 
Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 479 
(1989); Pendergast v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 691 F.3d 1224, 1226 (11th Cir. 
2012). 
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III. CURRENT PROBLEMS WITH ONLINE 
CONSUMER CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT 
The United States currently has no uniform system for 
interpreting and enforcing consumer contracts. Attempts to 
create a unified, codified approach have all failed to gain 
traction.53 As a result, generalist courts have assumed the 
role of enforcing online consumer contracts.54 
A. Courts’ Present Approach to Interpreting and 
Enforcing Consumer Contracts 
When presented with consumer contracts, courts have 
interpreted them according to the standard rules of 
commercial contracts.55 There are a handful of courts that 
have applied some differentiating principles; however, on the 
whole, courts have overwhelmingly applied general rules of 
contract interpretation with emphasis on the opportunity to 
read.56 Within this standard framework, courts have 
attempted to offer a degree of consumer protection through a 
variety of different principles, including unconscionability 
and unfair surprise.57 Unfortunately, these tools have very 
little bite. Unconscionability requires a showing of both 
procedural and substantive unfairness.58 Sellers are 
frequently able to avoid a finding of unconscionability simply 
by including the potentially problematic term conspicuously 
in their EULAs, as courts follow the duty to read doctrine 
and consistently hold that terms clearly stated in the 
 
53 See, e.g., Juliet M. Moringiello & William L. Reynolds, From Lord 
Coke to Internet Privacy: The Past, Present, and Future of the Law of 
Electronic Contracting, 72 MD. L. REV. 452, 457 (2013). 
54 See id. at 457–58. 
55 See id. 
56 See, e.g., id. at 469–70; John M. Norwood, A Summary of Statutory 
and Case Law Associated with Contracting in the Electronic Universe, 4 
DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 415, 449 (2006). 
57 See Bakos, Marotta-Wurgler & Trossen, supra note 15, at 5. 
58 A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 186 Cal. Rptr. 114, 121 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1982). 
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contract are not procedurally unconscionable.59 
Unconscionability plays a minimal role in consumer 
protection as it is difficult to establish.60 The same principle 
holds for unfair surprise as the objectionable terms are 
included in the EULA and the duty to read doctrine offers a 
ready defense. 
When evaluating forum selection clauses, a class of terms 
that gives rise to a significant portion of online consumer 
contract litigation,61 courts perform a more rigorous 
substantive evaluation of the term. Buyers can overcome the 
presumption of enforceability by showing that “enforcement 
would be unreasonable and unjust, or that the clause was 
invalid for such reasons as fraud or overreaching.”62 While 
the unreasonable and unjust criteria appear to have potency 
for consumer protection, the application of this test to forum 
selection clauses in consumer clickwrap contracts is flawed 
as it is the same test that is applied to forum selection 
clauses in contracts between two commercially sophisticated 
parties.63 This analysis presupposes that the parties 
otherwise formed a valid contract. Furthermore, courts have 
consistently refused to find forum selection clauses contained 
in clickwrap EULAs invalid for any of the reasons stated in 
the test.64 
B. Courts Are Ill Suited to Interpreting and Enforcing 
Consumer Contracts 
As discussed in Part III.A of this Note, treating consumer 
contracts the same way as commercial contracts serves no 
autonomy function, violates principles of efficiency, and 
 
59 Plaut & Bartlett, supra note 28, at 293–94. 
60 Id.; see also Mark A. Lemley, Terms of Use, 91 MINN. L. REV. 459, 
463 (2006). 
61 Davis, supra note 50, at 589. 
62 M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15 (1972). 
63 Id. at 2 (describing the plaintiff and defendant, two corporations). 
64 See, e.g., Forrest v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 805 A.2d 1007, 1010 
(D.C. 2002); Caspi v. Microsoft Network, L.L.C., 732 A.2d 528, 532–33 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999). 
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provides poor consumer protection.65 Gilson, Sabel, and Scott 
explain, “[e]xtending the court’s inquiry beyond the 
contract’s four corners is necessary to prevent such 
necessarily passive parties from exploitation through 
adhesion to formal contract terms that do not reflect their 
real intentions.”66 Some scholars have suggested ways for 
courts to provide this necessary consumer protection. 
Proposals include reinvigorating already employed tools such 
as construing the contract against the drafter, applying a 
looser unconscionability standard, evaluating the contracts 
for public policy impact, and applying the standards of good 
faith and fair dealing.67 Despite the shortcomings of the 
present textualist approach adopted by courts and the appeal 
of simply encouraging courts to expand their present 
doctrines, a shift in courts’ interpretive approach is not the 
solution. 
Courts are fundamentally ill suited to providing the sort 
of ex post review of intentions and interests that meaningful 
consumer protection requires.68 As consumers do not provide 
meaningful assent to contract terms, consumer protection 
requires that a party besides the self-interested seller 
represent the consumer’s interests, be it ex ante or ex post.69 
The nature of the judicial system dictates that any court-
provided consumer protection come ex post. This type of 
protection would require courts to evaluate terms for 
fairness and to make the ultimate determination that the 
consumer would have agreed to the contract had he been 
aware of and understood the terms. The problem with 
tasking courts with this type of evaluation is their poor 
positioning to determine consumer interests.70 Courts are ill 
 
65 See supra Part III.A. 
66 Gilson, Sabel & Scott, supra note 5, at 27. 
67 Hakes, supra note 7, at 110–11. 
68 See Gilson, Sabel & Scott, supra note 5, at 75. 
69 Gillette, supra note 31, at 685. 
70 Karl N. Llewellyn, Book Review, 52 HARV. L. REV. 700, 703–04 
(1939) (reviewing OTTO PRAUSNITZ, THE STANDARDIZATION OF COMMERCIAL 
CONTRACTS IN ENGLISH AND CONTINENTAL LAW (1937)). 
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suited to making normative decisions regarding what 
consumers believe about the contracts they form.71 
C. Proposals to Solve the Problem of Online Consumer 
Contracts 
In addition to proposals to expand the role of the courts in 
protecting consumer rights, scholars and policy makers have 
proposed other methods of reforming consumer contract 
evaluation and enforcement. One attempt to address the 
problems posed by online consumer contracts was 
promulgated by members from the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in the Uniform 
Computer Information Transactions Act (“UCITA”).72 
UCITA, proposed in 2002, was a proposal to revise several 
core elements of online consumer contracting.73 The Act was 
an unmitigated failure; the ALI withdrew its support and 
only two jurisdictions ultimately adopted it.74 Theorized 
reasons for the failure of UCITA include having too many 
cooks in the kitchen, persistent disagreement over whether a 
specific body of law is necessary for online contracting, and 
the fact that UCITA ultimately developed to be pro-seller.75 
Following the failure of UCITA, the ALI developed its 
own proposal to address the problems of online contracting 
in Principles of the Law of Software Contracts in 2009.76 
Following in the tradition of UCITA, this proposal has been 
widely ignored, receiving mention in only one court case.77 
Even had the ALI principles received greater attention, it is 
 
71 See Ayres & Schwartz, supra note 34, at 557–58. 
72 UNIF. COMPUTER INFO. TRANSACTIONS ACT, 7 U.L.A. 199 (2009). 
73 UNIF. COMPUTER INFO. TRANSACTIONS ACT § 114, 7 U.L.A. 280 cmt. 1 
(2009). 
74 Moringiello & Reynolds, supra note 53, at 487–89. 
75 Id. at 491; James Honbuckle, The Uniform Computer Information 
Transaction Act: State Legislatures Should Take a Critical Look Before 
Clicking Away Consumer Protections, 23 WHITTIER L. REV. 839, 847 (2002). 
76 Moringiello & Reynolds, supra note 53, at 474. 
77 Conwell v. Gray Loon Outdoor Mktg. Grp., Inc., 906 N.E.2d 805, 
811 (Ind. 2009); Moringiello & Reynolds, supra note 53, at 490. 
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unlikely their adoption would have had a meaningful impact 
on consumer protection. The primary emphasis of the ALI 
principles regarding consumer contracting involved 
increased disclosure of terms to ensure the opportunity to 
read.78 While this approach involves minimal costs and 
appears attractive as a way to bring consumer contracts 
within the traditional autonomy theory for contract 
enforcement, its effect would also likely be minimal.79 As 
discussed earlier in this Note, it is the cost of reading and 
understanding contract terms and not the cost of accessing 
those terms that is the primary cost associated with 
becoming informed of contract terms.80 Increased ease of 
access has no observable impact on the readership of terms.81 
The ALI also emphasizes the role of the informed 
minority82—an enforcement mechanism that has been 
empirically shown to be ineffective83—and third party 
watchdog websites.84 These watchdog websites, too, have 
proven ineffective if for no other reason than consumers 
overwhelmingly fail to access them.85 
IV. THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION’S 
POTENTIAL ROLE 
A. What a Good Solution Requires 
Theorizing about ways to improve upon consumer 
contract interpretation is a popular hobby amongst 
academics.86 Out of all of this theorizing, five general 
 
78 Marotta-Wurgler, supra note 26, at 165. 
79 See Bakos, Marotta-Wurgler & Trossen, supra note 15, at 6. 
80 Id. at 1. 
81 Id. at 32. 
82 Marotta-Wurgler, supra note 26, at 167. 
83 Bakos, Marotta-Wurgler & Trossen, supra note 15, at 24. 
84 Id. at 32. 
85 Id. at 32–33. 
86 See generally Ayres & Schwartz, supra note 34; Davis, supra note 
50; Gilson, Sabel & Scott, supra note 5. 
SMITH – FINAL 
No. 2:512] THE FTC AND ONLINE CONSUMER CONTRACTS 529 
approaches emerge. First is the camp advocating for 
consumer protection through increased disclosure.87 The 
ALI’s Principles of the Law of Software Contracts falls 
squarely within this school of thought.88 Advocates of 
disclosure as the optimal remedy argue that it should 
decrease the non-readership problem,89 provide a theoretical 
justification for enforcing contracts that one party does not 
understand,90 create an informed minority, and allow 
watchdog groups to better advise consumers.91 They also 
advocate for protection through disclosure as a low-cost 
option.92 Unfortunately, as discussed in Part III.C, disclosure 
has failed to achieve its expected outcomes in any 
meaningful way.93 Furthermore, as Omri Ben-Shahar and 
Carl E. Schneider argue, disclosure is not without cost.94 
Each additional disclosure takes away attention from 
already existing disclosures; increasing the visibility of one 
term makes other terms less conspicuous.95 Additionally, 
courts might use the existence of heightened disclosure to tip 
the scale in favor of enforcement for the seller based upon 
the exculpatory effect of procedural fairness on substantive 
unfairness. Thus, disclosure could actually become a tool 
 
87 See generally PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF SOFTWARE CONTRACTS 
§ 2.02 (AM. LAW INST. 2009); see also Hillman & O’Rourke, supra note 12, 
at 95. 
88 PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF SOFTWARE CONTRACTS § 2.02(c) (AM. LAW 
INST. 2009). 
89 Id. § 2.02 cmt. h (“[A]ffording transferees the opportunity to read 
and compare terms prior to a transaction as well as during or, in the case 
of shrinkwrap, sometimes even after a transaction is likely the most 
promising of many imperfect solutions.”) 
90 See Moringiello & Reynolds, supra note 53, at 470. 
91 Bakos, Marotta-Wurgler & Trossen, supra note 15, at 33. 
92 Cf. Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Futility of Cost-
Benefit Analysis in Financial Disclosure Regulation, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. 
S253, S255 (2014) (discussing mandated disclosure in various regulatory 
contexts). 
93 See supra Part III.C. 
94 Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 92, at S256. 
95 Id. at S256–57. 
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used by sellers to impose their terms, especially because 
there is evidence that increased disclosure does not lead to 
increased reading of terms by consumers.96 
A second approach to overcoming the market failure 
discussed above involves creating a list of presumptively 
unenforceable terms. The European Union has adopted this 
approach in their Directive on Unfair Terms (“EU 
Directive”).97 The EU Directive creates a non-exhaustive list 
of terms that are presumptively unfair and therefore 
unenforceable.98 This approach benefits sellers by reducing 
the risk of litigation and increasing certainty regarding the 
enforceability of terms.99 It benefits buyers by providing a 
third party to perform the review of terms that consumers 
are consistently unwilling to do for themselves.100 While 
some praise the EU Directive as a good step towards 
consumer protection, it is not a panacea.101 Clayton Gillette 
approves of the EU Directive in theory, but refrains from a 
unilateral endorsement, explaining, “[t]he success of a pre-
approval process . . . depends on the institutional capacity of 
the agency to consider the proposed contract as a whole as 
well as the effect of a particular clause within it.”102 A list of 
presumptively unenforceable terms certainly does provide a 
level of consumer protection, but Gillette’s concern regarding 
the importance of evaluating a contract as a whole and not 
just as individual terms provides a useful qualification on 
the approach’s effectiveness. Gilson, Sabel, and Scott, who 
are in favor of this European-style regime, also voice some 
concerns about its application.103 Specifically, Gilson, Sabel, 
and Scott voice concern over the EU Directive’s lack of an 
 
96 Bakos, Marotta-Wurgler & Trossen, supra note 15, at 34. 
97 Council Directive 93/13/EEC, 1993 O.J. (L 95) 29 (EC). 
98 Id. at art. 3, Annex. 
99 Clayton P. Gillette, Pre-Approved Contracts for Internet Commerce, 
42 HOUS. L. REV. 975, 986 (2005). 
100 Id. at 987. 
101 See id. at 985–87; Gilson, Sabel & Scott, supra note 5, at 77–79. 
102 Gillette, supra note 99, at 1001. 
103 Gilson, Sabel & Scott, supra note 5, at 77–79. 
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updating mechanism.104 As technology evolves and sellers 
adapt to new restrictions on consumer contracts, the contract 
evaluation mechanism must be able to change to provide for 
the current needs of consumer protection. Otherwise, it is 
likely to become less effective by the year. 
The third approach to consumer protection, pre-approval 
of individual contracts, answers some of Gillette’s concerns 
about evaluating contract terms in isolation. Israel has 
adopted this method, albeit on a voluntary basis.105 Under 
this policy, sellers can submit their contracts to a 
government tribunal and receive a seal of approval that they 
can place on their contract and use in marketing.106 This 
approach has the advantage of allowing pro-seller terms to 
be included that would be excluded under a blacklisted terms 
approach but that, taken in context, are not anti-
consumer.107 Unfortunately, the Israeli program offers little 
insight into the effectiveness of such an approach as very few 
companies have elected to take advantage of the certification 
service.108 The Israeli program does illustrate, however, that 
the advantages of a government-approved contract are 
insufficient to induce most sellers to voluntarily assent to 
such regulation. 
A fourth approach to consumer protection involves a term 
auditing process whereby sellers of a certain size are 
required to survey their customers to learn what 
expectations they hold regarding the contract terms.109 For 
all terms that substantially differ from consumer 
expectations, the seller would be required to highlight said 
term in a government-provided box similar to those used in 
mandatory credit disclosures.110 While this proposal 
 
104 Id. at 79. 
105 Standard Contracts Law, 5743–1982, §§ 12–13, 37 LSI 6 (1982) 
(Isr.). 
106 Id. §§ 12, 13, 15. 
107 Gillette, supra note 99, at 982. 
108 Id. at 985. 
109 Ayres & Schwartz, supra note 34, at 545. 
110 Id. 
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minimizes the costs of becoming informed about terms, 
reduces bureaucratic intrusion into contracting, and 
maximizes the benefit of reading highlighted terms, it 
nonetheless falls short. The primary problem with this 
proposal is its theoretical and unproven nature. Additionally, 
it comes with the significant cost to sellers of having to 
conduct regular surveys of their customers. While interesting 
as a theoretical solution to the problem of consumer agency 
in contracting, the proposal should not be taken too seriously 
otherwise. The failure of less radical proposals (the ALI 
principles and UCITA) to gain support and acceptance 
suggests that there would be serious obstacles to realizing 
this proposal. Therefore, this Note will focus on other 
solutions to the consumer contracting problem. 
The fifth distinct approach to consumer protection 
involves the use of mandatory default rules.111 Margaret 
Radin unapologetically argues that EULAs simply are not 
contracts and that attempting to enforce them as such is an 
exercise in futility. She eschews all attempts to provide a 
surrogate for the consumer in the contract formation process 
and instead calls for a regime of mandatory default rules for 
all rights deemed to be essential to consumer protection.112 
In particular, Radin believes that the rights to a jury trial, to 
bring suit in a class action, to be covered by a substantial 
warranty, to receive expectation damages, and to fair-use 
rights should not be disclaimable.113 While this proposal does 
solve many of the problems of consumer contracting, the 
practical obstacles to implementing such a radical plan 
render the actual implementation of the plan unlikely. 
Additionally, as Omri Ben-Shahar explains, in addition to 
“unintended consequences of such a liability scheme on 
 
111 See generally MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE 
PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW (2013). 
112 See id. at 213 (“[M]y preliminary suggestion is that a purported 
contract containing offending boilerplate should be declared invalid in 
toto, and recipients should instead be governed by the background legal 
default rules.”). 
113 See Ben-Shahar, supra note 13, at 892. 
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prices, affordability, and cross-subsidies,” “[t]o be practical, 
[Radin’s proposal] would have to overcome doctrinal 
distinctions reflecting deep-rooted policies that partition the 
universe of private actions between contract and tort law.”114 
Furthermore, “to be relevant, [the proposal] would have to 
capture wrongful behavior not currently actionable under 
state consumer protection statutes.”115 Therefore, this Note 
will focus on other solutions to the consumer contracting 
problem. 
B. Basis of the FTC’s Authority 
Congress founded the FTC in 1914 to prevent unfair 
methods of competition.116 This authority is provided in 
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (“Section 
5”).117 The mission of the FTC broadened over time and, with 
the passing of the Wheeler-Lea Amendment in 1938, the 
FTC’s authority extended to cover unfair or deceptive acts 
regardless of any effect on competition.118 Specifically, the 
Wheeler-Lea Amendment codified the principle “that certain 
merchandising practices are forbidden by section 5 even 
though they are neither deceptive nor anticompetitive.”119 
Section 5’s only substantive guideline for determining 
fairness grants the FTC broad discretion, allowing the 
Commission to find a practice unfair if it “causes or is likely 
to cause substantial injury to consumers which is not 
reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves and not 
outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to 
competition.”120 Beyond this, the legislative record “provides 
 
114 Id. at 902. 
115 Id. 
116 See FTC v. Cinderella Career & Finishing Sch., Inc., 404 F.2d 
1308, 1311 (D.C. Cir. 1968). 
117 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2012). 
118 See, e.g., Cinderella, 404 F.2d at 1311; ROBERT M. LANGER ET AL., 
Unfair Methods of Competition, in 12 CONN. PRAC., UNFAIR TRADE 
PRACTICES § 2.4 (2015). 
119 LANGER ET AL., supra note 118, at § 2.4. 
120 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (2012). 
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little concrete guidance in interpreting section 5”121 and in 
fact shows that Congress intentionally chose not to provide 
the FTC with meaningful guidelines for interpreting the 
term “unfair.”122 In the years since the promulgation of the 
FTC Act, courts have upheld the FTC’s authority to interpret 
Section 5 for itself.123 In FTC v. Accusearch, the court held 
that the FTC’s autonomy in interpreting unfairness was so 
expansive that the FTC need not show a violation of any 
particular law in order to find a practice unfair.124 The FTC 
has broadly used this authority in applications including the 
Door-to-Door Sales Rule,125 the Credit Practices Rule,126 and 
the Holder-in-Due-Course Rule.127 
In addition to the FTC’s broad authority under Section 5 
of the FTC Act, specific consumer protection statutes also 
empower the Commission.128 These statutes include the 
Equal Credit Opportunity Act, the Truth-in-Lending Act, the 
Fair Credit Reporting Act, the Cigarette Labeling Act, the 
Do-Not-Call Implementation Act of 2003, the Children’s 
Online Privacy Protection Act, the Fair and Accurate Credit 
Transactions Act of 2003, and the Controlling the Assault of 
 
121 David A. Rice, Consumer Unfairness at the FTC: Misadventures in 
Law and Economics, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 13 (1984). 
122 FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 239–40 (1972). 
123 See, e.g., FTC v. Accusearch, Inc., 570 F.3d 1187, 1194 (10th Cir. 
2009) (“[T]he FTCA enables the FTC to take action against unfair 
practices that have not yet been contemplated by more specific laws.”). 
124 Id.  
125 16 C.F.R. pt. 429 (2015) (requiring door-to-door salespeople to 
furnish receipts and providing the buyer with right to cancel a contract 
within three days of formation). 
126 16 C.F.R. pt. 444 (2015) (prohibiting unfair credit practices). 
127 16 C.F.R. pt. 433 (2015) (subjecting any holder of a consumer 
credit contract to all claims which the debtor could assert against the 
seller). 
128 FED. TRADE COMM’N, A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE FEDERAL TRADE 
COMMISSION’S INVESTIGATIVE AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AUTHORITY (2008), 
https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/what-we-do/enforcement-authority [http://per 
ma.cc/ZC6U-EC2D] [hereinafter FTC OVERVIEW]. 
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Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act of 2003, 
among others.129 
C. Similar Implementations of the FTC’s Authority 
1. Computer Privacy 
Closely related to EULAs130—and thus a fruitful 
application for comparison—is the FTC’s regulation of 
consumer online privacy rights. The FTC began its work on 
online privacy in 1995 at the urging of Congress.131 
Interestingly, this invitation came with no explicit expansion 
of the FTC’s powers.132 The FTC was therefore left to use its 
already existing Section 5 powers to police computer 
privacy.133 Using this Section 5 approach, the FTC regulated 
privacy by bringing administrative complaints against online 
companies it felt violated Section 5 principles.134 As of April 
2014, the FTC had brought 170 privacy complaints against 
online sellers.135 This appears to be an inconsequentially 
small number considering the prevalence of computer 
privacy problems; however, the FTC’s impact extends beyond 
these individual cases.136 FTC administrative decisions have 
 
129 Id. 
130 Scott Killingsworth, Minding Your Own Business: Privacy Policies 
in Principle and in Practice, 7 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 57, 91–92 (1999) (“It is 
no stretch to regard [a website’s privacy] policy as an offer to treat 
information in specified ways, inviting the user’s acceptance, evidenced by 
using the site or submitting the information. The website’s promise and 
the user’s use of the site and submission of personal data are each 
sufficient consideration to support a contractual obligation.”). 
131 Steven Hetcher, The FTC as Internet Privacy Norm Entrepreneur, 
53 VAND. L. REV. 2041, 2046 (2000). 
132 See Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New 
Common Law of Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 585, 602–04 (2014). 
133 Id at 598–99. 
134 Id. 
135 Id. at 600. 
136 Id. at 583. 
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become a sort of common law for privacy137 and “establish 
compliance requirements for companies to follow in avoiding 
similar actions being brought against them in the future.”138 
Thus, it is misleading to view the relatively small number of 
privacy-related cases as a proxy for the FTC’s impact on 
consumer online privacy. Additionally, the FTC has issued 
guidelines and press releases providing insight into what 
privacy practices it might consider unfair.139 While these 
publications are generally vague, practitioners look to them 
as well as to past administrative rulings as guides on how to 
avoid FTC action.140 
In evaluating consumers’ rights to privacy online, the 
FTC has looked beyond the four corners of seller-drafted 
privacy policies to consider entire dealings,141 industry 
standards and other norms,142 and even consumer 
expectations.143 The FTC will deem a privacy violation illegal 
even if it does not violate any written element of the seller’s 
privacy policy.144 Increasingly, the FTC has found privacy 
rights to be embedded in consumer expectations of privacy.145 
While this approach does appear radical, it is certainly a 
more effective stance towards consumer protection than 
allowing self-interested sellers to determine consumer 
privacy rights through their privacy statements. In 2009, the 
FTC used this tactic in the revolutionary case In re Sears 
Holdings, where it found that Sears was engaging in a 
deceptive practice and violating Section 5, despite a 
 
137 Id. 
138 Susan E. Gindin, Nobody Reads Your Privacy Policy or Online 
Contract? Lessons Learned and Questions Raised by the FTC’s Action 
Against Sears, 8 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1, 2 (2009). 
139 Solove & Hartzog, supra note 132, at 625–26. 
140 Id. at 621, 625–26. 
141 Letter from James C. Miller III, Chairman, FTC, to Hon. John D. 
Dingell, Chairman, House Comm. on Energy & Commerce (Oct. 14, 1983), 
reprinted in Cliffdale Assocs., Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110, 174, 176 (1984). 
142 Solove & Hartzog, supra note 132, at 636. 
143 Id. at 661, 666. 
144 Id. at 641. 
145 Id. at 666–67. 
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notification of the use of tracking software in its Privacy 
Statement and User License Agreement.146 This considerable 
authority to enforce consumer expectations of privacy is 
founded upon Section 5 rather than any specific statute.147 
D. EULAs Are Appropriately Analogized to Areas 
Where the FTC Presently Exercises Its Authority 
The power that the FTC possesses under Section 5 of the 
FTC Act and that it has exercised in a diverse array of 
consumer protection issues can naturally be extended to 
interpreting and enforcing EULAs. This application falls 
squarely within the FTC’s mission of consumer protection148 
and meets the requirements for appropriate FTC action.149 
As the former chairman of the FTC, Deborah Majoras, has 
explained, the FTC’s “obligation . . . is to identify and 
recognize the equivalents of good ‘hand-offs’ in the 
formulation of competition and consumer protection 
policy.”150 EULA interpretation and enforcement is an 
excellent candidate for FTC action under this guideline.151 As 
discussed in Part III.B of this Note, the inclusion and pricing 
(or lack thereof) of fine print terms in consumer contracts 
represents a market failure.152 As prices by and large do not 
reflect fine-print terms,153 and consumers do not base their 
purchasing decisions on fine-print terms that should 
 
146 See Complaint at ¶¶ 9, 14, In re Sears Holdings Mgmt. Corp., FTC 
File No. 082-3099, No. C-4264, 2009 WL 2979770 (F.T.C. Aug. 31, 2009). 
147 See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 132, at 598. 
148 Sidney M. Milkis, The Federal Trade Commission and Consumer 
Protection: Regulatory Change and Administrative Pragmatism, 72 
ANTITRUST L.J. 911, 913–14 (2005). 
149 See Deborah Platt Majoras, Celebrating the Federal Trade 
Commission: Introductory Remarks for the 90th Anniversary Symposium, 
72 ANTITRUST L.J. 755, 757 (2005). 
150 Id. 
151 See supra Part III.B. 
152 See supra Part III.B. 
153 See Bakos, Marotta-Wurgler & Trossen, supra note 15, at 29. 
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materially affect the value of products,154 regulation of the 
consumer contracting process would be unlikely to adversely 
impact competition. Online sellers presently compete very 
little through their contract terms; therefore, regulating 
those terms would not supplant an effective market 
mechanism. In truth, FTC regulation would likely increase 
competition by removing seller discretion in this currently 
non-competitive area of contracting. Courts generally defer 
to the FTC’s interpretations and application of its authority 
based on its evaluation of market impact.155 Legal academics 
and economists have already done the bulk of the work for 
the FTC, showing that regulation of terms would have 
minimal adverse effect on market efficiency and would in 
fact improve it.156 
Additionally, it should not be an impediment to FTC 
regulation of EULAs that these online agreements fall 
within the domain of contract law. Privacy policies too are 
properly characterized as contracts, yet this designation has 
posed no impediment to the FTC’s assuming the role of 
regulator.157 Not only has the existence of privacy contracts 
not prevented the FTC from assuming the regulatory role in 
lieu of courts, it has also not prevented the Commission from 
ignoring the dickered terms and enforcing an alternate 
regime of consumer expectations.158 Professors Solove and 
Hartzog note, “[w]hile contract law tends to give great 
weight to the boilerplate terms of a contract, the FTC does 
not appear to recognize any kind of significant presumption 
to exculpatory representations buried in dense legalese that 
run contrary to other representations or consumer 
expectations.”159 Not only does this tendency suggest the 
FTC as a natural protector of consumer rights in online 
contracts, it also highlights the strange situation that the 
 
154 See id. at 32. 
155 See Rice, supra note 121, at 18. 
156 See supra Part III.B. 
157 See Killingsworth, supra note 130, at 91–92. 
158 See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 132, at 671–72. 
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FTC does not presently play such a role. This is all the more 
surprising as the privacy policies that the FTC does police 
are increasingly contained within EULAs.160 Extending FTC 
oversight to the entirety of the EULA could not be a more 
natural exercise of FTC authority. 
Furthermore, courts have looked favorably upon self-
initiated extensions of the FTC’s authority. In fact, Professor 
David Rice believes that “the principal long term influence of 
the courts, and the Supreme Court in particular, has been 
the validation of Commission interpretations that bring 
previously unregulated practices within the agency’s 
substantive jurisdiction.”161 It is true that Congress has 
viewed some FTC initiatives, such as the Cigarette Rule and 
the proposed children’s advertising rule (known as “Kid 
Vid”), as inappropriate extensions of the FTC’s authority.162 
However, these instances do not suggest narrow FTC 
jurisdiction. In the instance of the Cigarette Rule, the FTC 
deferred to Congress, which had decided to take up the issue 
itself.163 In the instance of Kid Vid, the FTC’s attempt to 
regulate advertising to children led to Congress temporarily 
revoking the FTC’s authority to promulgate rules based on 
its Section 5 powers.164 This dramatic negative reaction by 
Congress was a result not only of the fact that “measures 
proposed by the agency . . . smacked of censorship, but the 
proceeding was also run in such a way that affected business 
interests could claim, with considerable justification, that 
 
160 Id. at 588. 
161 Rice, supra note 121, at 17. 
162 See Milkis, supra note 148, at 918, 925. In the Cigarette Rule, the 
FTC attempted to require health warnings on tobacco advertising. Unfair 
or Deceptive Advertising and Labeling of Cigarettes in Relation to the 
Health Hazards of Smoking, Statement of Basis and Purpose, 29 Fed. Reg. 
8324, 8355 (July 2, 1964), withdrawn, 30 Fed. Reg. 9484 (July 29, 1965). 
In Kid Vid, the FTC sought to limit television marketing of sugary foods to 
children. Children’s Advertising: Proposed Trade Regulation Rulemaking 
and Public Hearing, 43 Fed. Reg. 17,967, 17,969 (proposed Apr. 27, 1978). 
163 Milkis, supra note 148, at 918. 
164 Id. at 926. 
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they were not granted a fair hearing.”165 Neither the 
problems associated with the Cigarette Rule nor those 
associated with Kid Vid would apply to regulation of 
consumer EULAs. Congress is not presently contemplating 
its own digital consumer protection regime and a consumer 
contract protection program would not raise censorship 
concerns. FTC rules could be implemented in a way that 
considers and integrates business interests. 
E. Methods for FTC Interpretation and Enforcement of 
EULAs 
Should the FTC elect to extend its authority to cover 
EULAs, it must decide between a rules regime or an 
enforcement action regime. Under the Magnuson-Moss Act of 
1975, the FTC has the power to promulgate industry-wide 
rules and sue in state or federal courts.166 In addition to this 
rule-making authority, the FTC also has the long-standing 
power under Section 5 to bring administrative actions 
against businesses it believes to be in violation of fair 
practice.167 
1. Promulgate Rules 
The primary advantage of a rules-based approach is the 
relative ease of enforcement. Specific rules for what 
constitutes an unfair consumer contract term remove the 
burden from the FTC of having to prove that a company 
acted unfairly.168 The FTC must only show that the company 
violated a discrete rule in order to prove its case. This 
approach would also bring American consumer contract law 
more in line with the European approach of greylisting 
 
165 Id. at 925–26. 
166 Id. at 923. 
167 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2012). 
168 Mark E. Budnitz, The Federalization and Privatization of Public 
Consumer Protection Law in the United States: Their Effect on Litigation 
and Enforcement, 24 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 663, 671 (2008). 
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unsuitable terms.169 However, there are practical 
impediments to the rules approach. Most significantly, 
promulgating rules has fallen out of practice with the FTC 
recently.170 “[M]ost recent FTC regulations have been issued 
pursuant to specific mandates from Congress in legislation 
dealing with narrow issues rather than under its discretion 
to draft regulations under its broad authority to regulate 
unfair and deceptive acts or practices.”171 As regulation of 
consumer contracts must necessarily be based on the FTC’s 
Section 5 powers, a rules-based approach seems practically 
precluded even if it would be legally valid. 
2. Enforcement Actions 
The alternate form of enforcement, administrative 
judicial action, can have a similar effect to direct rule-
making.172 It is true that enforcement actions offer “far less 
comprehensive protection, for [they] affect[] only the 
company targeted.”173 However, “[a]ction against one 
company sends a warning to other companies that they also 
may be subject to an FTC enforcement action.”174 Thus, 
enforcement actions can have as wide an effect as rules.175 
Furthermore, as a mass of administrative opinions 
accumulates, a common-law-style body of rules naturally 
develops. This has been the case for privacy actions.176 Rules 
naturally emerge from administrative decisions that 
“establish compliance requirements for companies to follow 
in avoiding similar actions being brought against them in the 
future.”177 This approach has the added advantage of 
 
169 See supra Part VI.A; see also Council Directive 93/13/EEC, 1993 
O.J. (L 095) 29 (EC). 
170 Budnitz, supra note 168, at 671. 
171 Id. 
172 See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 132, at 586. 
173 Budnitz, supra note 168, at 671. 
174 Id. 
175 See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 132, at 587. 
176 Id. at 583. 
177 Gindin, supra note 138, at 2. 
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providing its own updating mechanism. The natural 
development of consumer contract rules through a common-
law approach provides the flexibility to change with 
developing technology and consumer preferences. This is 
exactly the sort of updating mechanism that the European 
regime has been criticized for lacking.178 A final stroke in 
favor of the enforcement action approach is the power of 
precedent. “Starting with the Reagan administration . . . [the 
FTC has] concentrated on attacking unfair and deceptive 
practices on a case-by-case basis.”179 
F. Limits on FTC Effectiveness 
As natural a fit as online consumer contracts are for FTC 
regulation, there are several shortcomings to this approach. 
Among these flaws are (1) the absence of a private right of 
action under Section 5,180 (2) the inability of the FTC to 
mandate civil penalties on its own,181 and (3) the FTC’s 
limited resources.182 All of these shortcomings can be 
minimized through concerted action between the FTC and 
the courts. As Gilson, Sabel, and Scott explain, “[w]hat a 
generalist court can do better . . . is to assess the facts in 
individual disputes and measure the distance between the 
baseline and the contractual terms and conditions in the 
disputed contract.”183 Through a minimal number of 
administrative proceedings, the FTC can establish the 
baseline of which Gilson, Sabel, and Scott speak. Consumers 
can then bring cases against sellers in generalist courts 
under the common-law doctrines of unconscionability or 
unfair surprise.184 The baseline provided by the FTC can be 
 
178 See Gilson, Sabel & Scott, supra note 5, at 79. 
179 Budnitz, supra note 168, at 671. 
180 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2012). 
181 FTC Renews Support for Legislation to Raise Penalties in Data 
Privacy Cases, 75 U.S. L. WK. 2613 (Apr. 17, 2007). 
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used to give teeth to the presently underutilized consumer 
protection doctrines.185 
V. CONCLUSION 
The problems with present online consumer protection—
or perhaps more accurately, the lack thereof—coupled with 
the failure of proposals for common-law reforms or more 
dramatic regulatory interventions suggests that an extra-
judicial, extra-political approach is necessary. The FTC has 
the power to provide just such a consumer protection 
program. As a centralized, federal organization, the FTC is 
not encumbered by the same institutional inertia or 
deference for stare decisis that the judiciary is.186 As a body 
one degree removed from the democratic process, the FTC 
additionally does not require political consensus on its 
action.187 This freedom has allowed the FTC to make wildly 
popular regulations in the past, such as the do-not-call list188 
and the Holder-in-Due-Course rule,189 which would have 
been unfeasible for Congress to pass and outside of the 
courts’ authority.190 Online consumer contracts are another 
similar area ripe for FTC intervention; the public desires 
government regulation and even believes their contracts are 
already regulated,191 and political and judicial bodies have 
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